Whether Great Britain was
well or ill advised in accepting this rule is a question which it is now
useless to discuss, for the decision cannot be recalled, and the rule
must be regarded as established beyond controversy. Its effect is
greatly to diminish the pressure which a victorious navy can bring to
bear upon a hostile State. It deprives Great Britain of one of the most
potent weapons which she employed in the last great war. To-day it would
be impracticable even for a victorious navy to cut off a continental
State from seaborne traffic. The ports of that State might be blockaded
and its merchant ships would be liable to capture, but the victorious
navy could not interfere with the traffic carried by neutral ships to
neutral ports. Accordingly, Great Britain could not now, even in the
event of naval victory being hers, exercise upon an enemy the pressure
which she formerly exercised through the medium of the neutral States.
Any continental State, even if its coasts were effectively blockaded,
could still, with increased difficulty, obtain supplies both of raw
material and of food by the land routes through the territory of its
neutral neighbours. But Great Britain herself, as an insular State,
would not, in case of naval defeat, have this advantage.
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