We dismounted and
fired away vaguely at the distant foe, not so much with the idea of
hitting anything, but it is always a relief to one's feelings. I don't
know why the guns didn't come up, but was told that they didn't like to
push on too far, as the Boers were supposed to be in force here. It
seemed a pity to miss such a good shot, especially as we had an enormous
great escort and an open country back to camp. But that is the way with
guns; sometimes they rush up to within 500 yards of the enemy before
they shoot, and sometimes they won't shoot at all.
The afternoon was spent in carrying out our reconnaissance. A
reconnaissance is undertaken with a view to exposing the enemy's
position and strength. Without intending a real attack, you demonstrate,
feign a forward movement, push on in one place or another, or threaten
to turn his flanks; so obliging him to move his men here and there,
expose his strength and the limits of the position, and, perhaps, the
whereabouts and number of his guns, if they should be tempted to open
fire at our scouts. This is the theory of the thing. In practice it
doesn't quite work, owing to the utter ignorance of the Boers of all
military tactics. On all occasions when we have carried out these
manoeuvres, notably round the Magersfontein hills before the battle,
they have not only failed to make the proper responses to our moves, but
have neglected to take notice of them in any way whatever.
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